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THE RHETORIC OF LEGAL BACKFIRE
ROBERT A. HILLMAN*
Abstract: This Article focuses on legal backfire claims. A claim of legal
backfire constitutes the position that a law produces or will produce
results directly contrary to one or more of those intended. Legal
backfire claims are pervasive, yet potentially misleading and harmful
argumentation used primarily to undermine existing law (or policy) or
to forestall the enactment of new law. This Article analyzes many
examples of legal backfire to suggest that the concept is often a
rhetorical strategy for opposing the promulgation of new law or policy
or for attempting to have existing law rolled back, and that actual legal
backfires are much more rare (or at least unproven) than use of the
rhetoric would suggest. This Article also addresses a much more basic
problem: the challenges to effective lawmaking and the limitations of
techniques to evaluate the effects of law make an accurate assessment of
law problematic. Ultimately, this Article suggests that lawmakers should
proceed with caution when dealing with legal backfire claims because
critics of laws almost invariably author these claims, the claims are
rhetorically charged, and the claims themselves are extraordinary.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of hate crime legislation claim that the laws "may inflame
prejudice rather than eradicate it." The Endangered Species Act,
some analysts assert, has destroyed some of the very creatures the Act
intended to protect. 2 Consumer protection laws are said to increase
* Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Manuel Atti-
enza, Kevin Clermont, Cynthia Farina, Richard Hillman, Douglas Kysar, Jeffrey Rachlinski,
and Irwin Stotzky for reading and commenting on this paper. Michael David, Annie Jeong,
Cynthia Quimby, Jennifer Schultz, Rob Schultz, and Brad Wilson provided excellent re-
search assistance.
Jeffery Rosen, Foreword, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1999) (describing JAMES B.
JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAw & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998)).
2 Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners, 24
ENVTL. L. 419, 424 (1994); John Charles Kunich, Species Co' Habitat Conservation: The Fallacy
of Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVT. L. 501, 561 & n.220
(1994) (citing Roberti. Smith, The Endangered Species Act: Saving Species or Stopping Growth?,
15 REGULATION: THE CATO REV. OF Bus. & Gorr. REG 83, 85 (Winter 1992)); see also Jef-
frey J. Rachlinski, Protecting Endangered Species Without Regulating Private Landowners: The
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prices and confuse consumers instead of arming them with legal
rights.3
These are examples of a pervasive, yet potentially misleading and
harmful mode of argumentation, I shall call "legal backfire" rhetoric,
used primarily to undermine existing law (or policy) or to forestall
the enactment of new law. A claim of legal backfire constitutes the
position that a law produces or will produce results directly contrary
to one or more of those intended. 4 The inventory of purported legal
backfires is almost endless. 5 So is the list of sources of the claim, in-
Case of Endangered Plants, 8 Colwell. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 1, 6-7 (1998) (reporting and refut-
ing other commentators' assertions that the Endangered Species Act has backfired).
3 See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
4
 Professor Sunstein has discussed "regulatory strategies ... that achieve an end pre-
cisely opposite to the one intended or to the only public-regarding justification that can be
brought forward in their support." Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U.
Cm. L. REV. 407, 407 (1990). The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire broadens the inquiry and con-
tests some of Sunstein's claims. See infra notes 185-191 and accompanying text.
5 Additional examples of claims of legal backfire, in no particular order, include: The
Environmental Protection Agency's actions to regulated coal-burning power plants is "so
inept that some of the nation's most populous areas will end up with a worse environment
than would have resulted if the new policy had never been put into effect." BRUCE A. Ace-
ERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 2 (1981). Toxic waste laws that
require cleaning up dumps before use of the land "drive[s] industry out to virgin fields,
where it encounters no such costs." PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 8 (1994). The Highway Beautification Act "thwarts
highway beautification." Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 467 (2000). Demands of
equality by gays sets back their cause. Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FottnHAtd L. REV. 1313, 1329 (1997). Trial judges' ad-
monitions to juries to disregard tainted evidence causes them to focus on that evidence.
Regina Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 345, 349 (1995). The
U.S. welfare system has produced dependency, unwillingness to work, increased nonmari-
tal births, drug abuse and crime." Peter Edelman, Missing Bobby, Searching for America's
Heart, by Robin Toner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, § 7 (Book Review), at 25. Boot camps for
juvenile offenders, which mimic aspects of military basic training in lieu of incarceration,
result in greater instead of lesser recidivism. Jayson Blair, Ideals & Trends; Boot Camps: An
Idea Whose Time Came and Went, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2000, § 4, at 3. Flexible spending ac-
counts, instead of "holdling] down medical costs encourage[] extra tnedical spend-
ing." David E. Rosenbaum, When Laws Shoot Themselves in the Foot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1999, § 4, at 2. "The government prohibition on cigarette advertising on television, de-
signed to decrease smoking, may have increased smoking ...." Sunstein, supra note 4, at
429. Remarkably, even the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit is not sacrosanct. A joint study by
the Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration reported that
lowering speed limits increased the number of accidents. Effects of Raising & Lowering
Speed Limits, Report No. FHWA-RD-92-084 (U.S. Dep't of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin.,
1992), available at Intp://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/s1-irrel/index.html,  discussed in Eric Peters,
Demise of 'Double Nickel' Speed Limit Sought, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at E13. The Federal
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eluding special interest groups, lawyers, legal theorists, legislators,
administrators and journalists, of all political stripes. 6
If all of the assertions of legal backfire were to be believed, our
law and policy makers would be doing a very poor job, to put it mildly.
In this Article, however, I analyze many examples of "legal backfire" to
suggest that the concept is often a rhetorical strategy for opposing the
promulgation of new law or policy or for attempting to have existing
law rolled back and that actual legal backfires are much more rare (or
at least unproven) than use of the rhetoric would suggest.? In fact, I
will show that true legal backfires may be so infrequent and use of the
rhetoric so common that backfire allegations should be met presump-
tively with suspicion rather than credence.
If I am correct about the suspiciousness of backfire rhetoric, this
leads to the question of why so few laws or policies, in place or sug-
gested, have been immune from the "legal backfire" allegation. There
are many reasons to be discussed in this Article.
First, legal backfire argumentation is very effective rhetoric. Al-
though simple and direct, it appears to close off debate. Unlike the
allegation that a law creates unintended costs, which invites a debate
about costs and benefits, the legal backfire claim leaves little room for
rebuttal (except, of course, based on the factual accuracy of the asser-
tion). 8 Backfire rhetoric is also dramatic and ironic, thereby capturing
the attention of the listener. Backfire arguments also appeal to the
emotions because of their complete and utter renunciation of the
opposing position's methods for achieving a goal, and are a source of
Communication Commission's fairness doctrine decreased instead of increased the broad-
casting of diverse viewpoints. See infra notes 44-72 and accompanying text. The fuel econ-
omy standards imposed on automobile manufacturers increased rather than decreased our
dependence on foreign oil. See infra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
More generally, attempts to invigorate citizens' sense of responsibility through law may
cause them to "recoil from responsibility." Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries
of the Self, 105 I1ARV. L. REV. 959,1001-1002 (1992); see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 408
(referring to the "omnipresence of regulatory paradoxes").
° See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
7
 This article does not focus on the common law, although many of the points proba-
bly apply. In addition, I am interested in whether a law has backfired with respect to one or
more of its goals, not whether the law's purposes were meritorious in the first place.
8 For example, critics of the Endangered Species Act assert that the law deters devel-
opment at great cost to society. CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE:
THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 25-26,175 (1995). Supporters can rebut the charge
by asserting that the benefits of the law in preserving species outweighs the costs. Such an
argument cannot be made, of course, in response to the criticism that the Endangered
Species Act has backfired.
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emotional release for authors of the backfire claim in an impassioned
attnosphere.9
Second, the dearth of persuasive empirical or other evidence that
analyzes the success or failure of a law invites critics to raise the level
of rhetoric about the harmfulness of a law. Relatedly, the multiplicity
of goals of a law allows critics to seize upon at least one goal difficult
or impossible to measure instrumentally and therefore a prime can-
didate for a backfire claim. In fact, often the highest aspiration of a
law is the most difficult to evaluate accurately and therefore an excel-
lent target of backfire critics. 1 °
Third, crafting laws is an uncertain science. Lawmakers face
many challenges pertaining to both creating the appropriate sub-
stance of the law and navigating through the processes of lawmak-
ing." Substantive concerns include minimizing hurdles to implemen-
tation and enforcement of the law, choosing the appropriate target
groups, assessing the possibility of changed circumstances, and avoid-
ing the creation of loopholes. Process issues include dealing with spe-
cial interests, evaluating the role of public opinion, and adopting ap-
propriate strategies of political compromise. 12 The range of potential
factors that might lead to a backfire confers on critics of a law lots of
ammunition to try to support their position that a law has backfired
and encourages critics to make the argument in the first place.
If legal backfire rhetoric is omnipresent and persuasive, but often
inaccurate, it also can be a hindrance to effective lawmaking. Re-
peated claims of backfire contribute to an anti-regulatory environ-
ment that may be unjustified and unhelpful. Serious issues may be
short-changed by undocumented claims of legal backfire, which by
their number and rhetorical force can poison the atmosphere against
creative and effective lawmaking., Indiscriminate legal backfire argu-
ments also undermine lawmakers' and the public's faith in particular
laws that may be serving a salutary purpose. Finally, the strategy deters
lawmakers from carefully reviewing difficult issues of social policy and
9 Cf. Ray Vaughan, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways oppo-
nents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protection for Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569, 584-
95 (1995) (describing the vitriolic nature of right-wing assaults on the Endangered Species
Act).
10 For example, hate crime laws seek to punish perpetrators, but another goal is to re-
duce prejudice. The difficulty of measuring the effect of such laws on racial issues allows
critics to counter that the laws only increase resentment and hate. See infra Part IV.
11 On all of this see infia Part II C.
12 See infra Part II C.
2002]	 The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire	 823
instigates "quick-fixes," which ultimately may be very unsatisfactory
responses to problems.
The point here is not that I can prove that there are no legal
backfires nor that I believe there are none. One claim of legal
backfire often heard, for example, involves the United States' eco-
nomic embargo of Cuba that was supposed to lead to the demise of
the Castro regime." Along with others, I suspect that, instead, the pol-
icy is "the one thing that keeps [Castro] in power, keeping up
[Cuba's] police state" by creating a "nationalistic aura" around Cas-
tro's rule." Despite my personal hunch, however, I would urge treat-
ing this backfire claim exactly as any other. As with any other law or
policy facing serious criticism, the government should engage in a
comprehensive review of its policy towards Cuba that takes into ac-
count the backfire claim, but it should not be swayed solely by the
rhetoric of legal backfire.
I also do not want to argue against people being zealous advo-
cates or to cast aspersions on the motives of backfire claimants." In
fact, a supportable backfire claim obviously may be the most pertinent
argument against adopting or continuing a law." Moreover, the vari-
ety of motives for a backfire claim appear to run the gamut from eco-
nomic self-interest, to philosophical differences with a law, to
conflicting value preferences. Few seem to have been made in bad
faith, simply to deceive the listener. In other words, my aim is not to
stifle healthy dialogue about the merits of laws, but to ask law and poi-
13 James Brooke, Embargo Seen as Aid n Castro; Canada, no, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000,
§ 1, at 9.
14 See id. at 9 (quoting Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy). Similar allegations
were made about the European Union's recent diplomatic sanctions against Austria for
including a far-right party in its government. Instead of provoking a change in Austria's
policy, the sanctions created a "nationalistic fervor." See, e.g., Austria Hails EU Decision to Lift
Sanctions, AlUZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2000, at Al2.
15 "Whether market rules are perfect or not, the good ends of economic activity are
best achieved if players play to win." ARTHUR TSAR APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES:
THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC & PROFESSIONAL LIFE 193 (1999); see also Cynthia R.
Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 109, 118 (2000) ("we too readily allow bad policy to be equated with bad mo-
tives").
16 More generally, critical arguments ensure that all sides are heard and that lawmak-
ers produce the best law. See APPLBAUM, sn/ira note 15, at 198.
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icy makers carefully to evaluate the support for backfire arguments
and not to be taken in solely by the rhetoric.°
Part I of this Article sets forth and discusses three prominent ex-
amples of claimed legal backfires and evaluates the merits of the ar-
guments. I conclude that the claims are seriously deficient. Part II ex-
plains why backfire arguments are so pervasive. Part III enumerates
the dangers of relying on assertions of legal backfire. Part IV illus-
trates how lawmakers can utilize the learning of the first three parts,
by focusing on one purported legal backfire involving recent hate-
crime legislation. How should lawmakers react to arguments that hate
crime laws increase intolerance and prejudice and therefore consti-
tute legal backfires? I conclude that they should be very wary of the
claims.
I. THE NATURE OF LEGAL BACKFIRE RHETORIC
A. Examples of Alleged Legal Backfires
In this subsection, I have selected three prominent examples of
the use of legal backfire rhetoric. One contributed to the demise of a
law, two may help induce the same consequence. Each involves regu-
lation by an administrative agency but, as the rest of the paper shows,
the kinds of problems that led critics to cry backfire are by no means
limited to agency administration. These selections show the nature of
a legal backfire argument, the breadth of its use, and the sources and
force of the rhetoric.
1. The Endangered Species Act
In order to protect and preserve endangered species, Congress
sought in the Endangered Species Act" (ESA) "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved . ."" Such conservation
17 See id. at 200-201 (the lack of careful monitoring of politics and government creates
a "disanalogy" between it and "the U.S. courtroom"); JEREMY BEN'FHAM, HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL FALLACIES 139-226 (Harold A. Larrabee ed., 1952) (tactics to rebuff reform
include "fallacies of confusion").
18 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2002).
19 Id. § 1531(b).
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benefits society because of the "esthetic, ecological, educational, his-
torical, recreational, and scientific value" of endangered species. 2°
The Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service [FWS]
implements the law for land, which is the focus here. 21 The FWS must
identify and list" species in need of protection because endangered
or threatened. 22 Although the ESA charges the FWS to promulgate
recovery plans for listed species to increase a species' chance of sur-
vival23 and to designate "critical habitat," which protects such habitat
against federal activity,24 the heart of the legal backfire claim involves
the Act's regulation of private land. 25 Before listing a species as en-
dangered or threatened, the FWS must notify the public of its inten-
tion to do so through publication in the Federal Register and in local
newspapers. 26 The ESA then protects listed animals from activity on
privately owned land that is harmful to them, including private land
development or harvesting of the land.27
20 Id- § 1531(a) (3).
21 The FWS also administers fresh water. The Department of Commerce's lsiational
Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) implements the law for the sea. See Vaughan, supra
note 9, at 571.
22 Id. at 571-72. The Act defines "endangered species" as "any species which is in dan-
ger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. (quoting 16
U.S.C. § 1532(6)). The Act defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range." Id. at 572 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (20)).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Book Review, Noah by the Numbers:
An Empirical Evaluation of the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 368 (1997);
Vaughan, supra note 9, at 573.
24
 Vaughan, supra note 9, at 572 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (A)). The FWS designates
critical habitat to protect it from federal agencies. See Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 368
(citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a) (3) (A) and 1532{5)). The FWS should designate such habitat
at time of listing, but it has designated critical habitat for only a small number of listed
species. See id. at 371.
23
 See id. at 6.
t6 See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994)); Vaughan, supra note 9, at 572 (citing 50
C.F.R. § 17.11 (1993) (wildlife); see also 50 C.F.R, § 17.12 (1993) (plants)).
27 Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 7. Landowners who violate the ESA are subject to fines or
imprisonment. See Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, 269 THE
ATLANTIC, Jan., 1992, at 97. Generally, protection of plant life on private land is left to
state law. See Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Specifically, section 9 of the ESA makes illegal on privately held land "taking" an "en-
dangered species." Vaughan, supra note 9, at 574 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) {1) (B)-(C)).
Taking means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id. at 574 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)). The
statute does not define "harm." See id. at 574-75. However, the FWS has promulgated a
regulation defining "harm" as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife," adding that
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The ESA may well be the prime target of opponents of environ-
mental causes.28
 Not surprisingly, critics claim that the Act is a legal
backfire. Not only do critics assert that the private-land provisions ex-
cessively stifle development and therefore unfairly limit landowners'
rights, which are clear costs of the legislation,29 opponents also claim
that these provisions actually accelerate the demise of endangered
species." The primary asserted cause of this legal backfire is that the
Act creates incentives for private landowners, who have notice that the
government will soon restrict potentially profitable uses of their land,
to avoid the Act's impact. 31 Landowners can do so in several ways.
They can destroy or modify the subject species' habitat on their land
or remove the species from their land (or worse) before the protec-
tions become effective. 32 Landowners can also fight the prospective
"such an act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering." Id. at 575 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1993)). Section 9
therefore forbids development or harvesting activities on private lad when the activity
harms endangered species. See Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 358; see also Michael Vivoli,
Note, "Harm"ing Individual Liberty: Assessing the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Babbitt u
Sweet Home, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 293 (1996) .
Section 9 does not apply the "taking" prohibition to threatened species. Vaughan, supra
note 9, at 574 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1)). However, the section does make illegal vio-
lation of regulations pertaining to threatened species. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a) (1) (G)). Such regulations include prohibitions on "taking" threatened species.
Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993); 50 C.F.R. § 17.71 (a) (1993); Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
28 See Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1; Vaughan, .supra note 9, at 584-604.
29 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 8, at 25-26, 175; Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 357-58
(discussing MANN & PLUMMER). Mann and Plummer claim that the Act fails in part be-
cause its drafters sought to save all species regardless of the costs—the so-called "Noah
Principle." Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 362-64 (citing MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 8, at
213-15); see also Mann & Plummer, supra note 27, at 47.
3° Kunich, supra note 2, at 561 & n.220 (citing Smith, supra note 2, at 85); see also
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 8, at 187-88, 196-97 (reporting such criticism as accurate);
Gidari, supra note 2, at 424 ("Because of the habitat modificatiOn restrictions now imposed
under section 9, landowners are taking pains to manage their lands so that protected, or
potentially protectable, species do not occupy the site."); Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 2
(reporting such criticisms but not supporting diem).
31 "Because section 9 can convert a 'worthwhile private endeavor' into a 'potential
crime,' it gives landowners 'great incentive to ensure that an official endangered species
never appears on their property.'" Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 364 (quoting MANN &
PLUMMER, supra note 8, at 187).
32 One critic explains:
[Title biology-is-law application of section 9 has resulted in unintended con-
sequences and has had a perverse effect on efforts to conserve species. Be-
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listing before the FWS, in court, and in the court of public opinion,
thereby draining resources from the FWS that could otherwise be
used to protect additional species." Even after the FWS lists a species,
the ESA may backfire, critics claim, because the government inade-
quately enforces the law." Despite the Act's serious penalty provisions,
the ESA's budget is low and few FWS agents police landowner activ-
ity." As a result, landowners can destroy endangered and threatened
species almost with impunity. One vocal opponent of the Act actually
supported such criminal activity on the theory that "[w]hen landown-
ers find an endangered animal on their property . . . the best solution
under current law is to 'shoot, shovel, and shut up.'"36
Has the Endangered Species Act backfired because of the private-
land restrictions? Although one Congressman claimed to have gov-
ernment confirmation of a large-scale backfire, nothing more than a
few anecdotes ultimately supported his assertion." Other critics also
mainly rely on anecdotes to support their allegations of perverse in-
cause of the habitat modification restrictions now imposed under section 9,
landowners are taking pains to manage their lands so that protected, or po-
tentially protectable, species do not occupy the site.
Gidari, supra note 2, at 424. Professor Rachlinski has reported such assertions in two arti-
cles. Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 6-7; Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 364-65.
" Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 6; Vaughan, supra note 9, at 586-87.
s' See Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 6.
35 Vaughan, supra note 9, at 577-78, 596-98. In addition, the Reagan and Clinton ad-
ministrations have been lax in investigating violations of the Act. Id. at 598-99.
36 Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered
Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826 (1997) (quoting Chuck Cushman, executive
director of the American Land Rights Association of Washington State, quoted in Martin
van der Werf, Endangered Species Act 'Gotta Be Fixed,' Foe Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 1, 1995, at
B1). Some people simply ignore the regulations. See id. at 854 (citing Eric Pryne, Private
Land vs. Habitat Protection, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al .).
Another related claim of backfire of the ESA involves the ineffectiveness of the Act as
compared to voluntary conservation. For example, lack of funding has delayed the listing
of species so that voluntary conservation efforts consistent with landowners' interests
might have been more effective. See Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 364-66 (discussing criti-
cism).
37 Hearing on the Endangered Species Act, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Rep.
Lamar Smith). Smith claimed that "Iolfficials at the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
contend that adding the golden-cheeked warbler and black-capped vireo to the endan-
gered species list has encouraged the rapid destruction of their habitat." Id. While disturb-
ing if true, this is hardly proof of an overall backfire or even the diminution of these spe-
cies.
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centives created by the Act.38 Often-repeated stories, for example, in-
volve landowners clear-cutting the timber on their land to avoid creat-
ing habitat for endangered species. 39 Still other critics rely on anec-
dotes to prove that the ESA generally has turned would-be
conservationists against wildlife 40 Although one commentator sug-
gested that such avoidance behavior and attitudinal changes consti-
tuted a trend,'" taken as a whole such stories prove only that the ESA's
landowner restrictions may create perverse incentives and attitudinal
changes under certain circumstances and with certain people. They
hardly prove that more species are being destroyed than saved as the
result of the private land-use restrictions of the Act.
In fact, to date, despite the FWS's production of hosts of data on
the ESA, the Act's effectiveness remains much of a mystery.° Still, the
best empirical study to date suggests that the ESA creates incentives
for private landowners to increase their efforts to protect endangered
species.° The allegation of a legal backfire has not been sustained.
" Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 361-62 (discussing critics). Another writer admitted
that only anecdotes supported his claim of backfire. SeeJ.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act
and Private Property: A Matter of Timing and Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & Pue. POL'Y 37, 50
(1998).
" Gidari, supra note 2, at 439-40 Sc nn.79-82 (citing Rob Taylor, Preserving Forests May
Pay Oft; Landowners Would Benty71 fi-orn Plan to Protect Wildlife, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 13, 1993, at BO; Mike \Tivoli, Shoot, Shovel &' Shut Up, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1992, at
Fl (clew cutting of timber to avoid creating habitat for the spotted owl). Ross Perot's con-
struction company cleared more than one hundred acres to allow development that oth-
erwise would have constituted habitat for the golden-cheeked warbler. For more on the
Ross Perot anecdote, see MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 8, at 196-97. See also Mann &
Plummer, supra note 27, at 47 ("Endangered Species Act works against people's incentives,
not with them.").
40 See Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects an
Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 Cum's. L. REV. 1, 46 (1994) (ESA "simply discourages vol-
untary efforts to conserve listed species on private land."). Sugg cites the experience of a
landowner who founded a conservation group and created habitat for bald eagles on his
land. Id. at 46-47. The government then forbade him from entering his land by truck. Id.;
see also John A. Baden, Creating Positive Rewards for Species Preservation, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
20, 1993, at B7.
41 See Kink' ► , supra note 2, at 561 & n.220 (citing Smith, supra note 2, at 85); see also
Gidari, supm note 2, at 424.
42 See Ruhl, supra note 38, at 37-38. "[S]pecies-by-species analyses with which to evalu-
ate landowner behaviors by type of landowner, type of land use, and magnitude of impact
are not widely available." Id. at n.3.
43 Professor Rachlinski compared the record of plant preservation in states that pro-
tect plant life on private land with those that do not (the ESA does not protect plant life
from private landowners). Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 2-3. He found that plants on private
land generally stiffer greater risks to their survival in states without regulation. Id. Rachlin-
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2. The Fairness Doctrine
As part of its charge from Congress to "to make available . . . to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service,"" the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), in a series of decisions and re-
ports, promulgated the fairness doctrine.* The FCC reasoned that
broadcasters, enjoying a limited resource, must operate in the public
interest, which requires a full airing of all viewpoints on controversial
issues.*
ski therefore concluded that "restrictions on private landowners benefit endangered and
threatened species." Id. at 32. He also surmised that a backfire would occur only when a
habitat is already vanishing; when landowners can keep habitat that they destroyed from
reappearing; when the cost of so doing is less than the costs of complying with the regula-
tions; and when landowners have knowledge of the facts. Id. at 7.
In another study, Rachlinski demonstrated that critics mistakenly rely on misleading
statistics that seemingly suggest the failure of the ESA. For example, critics point to the fact
that, since the passage of the Act, 721 species have been added to the list of endangered
species and only 21 species have been removed. Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 366. Rachlin-
ski pointed out, however, that "one must ask how many more would have been endangered
or even extinct if the Act had never become law." Id. Relying on the FWS's own data of the
status of species, Rachlinski reports that "endangered and threatened species are better off
with the Act than ... without it." Id. at 383. But Rachlinski's conclusions are clouded be-
cause the FWS's designation of species are subjective: "It is not clear when an increase in
population size constitutes 'improvement' or how long a population must remain constant
to be considered 'stable.' Ultimately these designations represent die subjective judgment
of the FWS, and may only imperfectly reflect a given species' true condition." Id. at 368.
44 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2001)).
4  For example, in 1949 the commission produced a report highlighting the impor-
tance of "providing and maintaining a climate of fairness and equal opportunity for the
expression of contrary views." In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254
(1949). That report nicely capsulized the goals of the fairness doctrine:
In the absence of a duty to present all sides of controversial issues, overt edi-
torialization by station licensees could conceivably result in serious abuse. But
where, as we believe to be the case under the Communications Act, such a re-
sponsibility for a fair and balanced presentation of controversial public issues
exists, we cannot see how the open espousal of one point of view by the licen-
see should necessarily prevent him from affording a fair opportunity for the
presentation of contrary positions . . . .
Id. The report changed broadcasters to cover public issues and to reflect opposing views.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). In 1964, the FCC issued a "Fair-
ness Primer," which underscored the fairness doctrine's application to "controversial issues
of public importance." Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Contro-
versial Issues of Public Importance (Fairness Primed, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416, 10,416 (1964).
46 In re Application of Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann.
Reg.
	32, modified in Great
Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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In 1959 Congress amended Section 315(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, to support the FCC's perception of the fairness ob-
ligation. The section underscored broadcasters' obligation "to oper-
ate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47 In
1967, the FCC promulgated rules to fill out the content of the fairness
doctrine such as the duties of a broadcaster to notify a person who was
the subject of a personal attack of its content and to offer free reply
time." In 1969, the Supreme Court held that the fairness doctrine's
regulation of broadcasters did not violate the First Amendment, pri-
marily because of the scarcity of airwaves.49
The fairness doctrine was controversial from the beginning be-
cause it regulated the airwaves and because compliance took its toll
on the pocketbooks of broadcasters.° Not surprisingly, predictions of
a legal backfire soon surfaced, which culminated in the FCC's issu-
ance of its "Fairness Report" during the anti-regulatory environment
of the Reagan years. 51 Despite earlier factual findings by the FCC that
the fairness doctrine "enhanc(ed] the flow of diverse viewpoints to
the public,"52 the Fairness Report concluded just the opposite. Ac-
cording to the report, the fairness doctrine stifled the airing of con-
troversial views by creating incentives for broadcasters to avoid all
controversial programming and with it the risk of having to offer free
time to respondents or of facing costly litigation and penalties, includ-
ing the possible loss of license.° In addition, the report found that, in
47
 Act of September 14, 1959, I, 73 Stat. 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934)
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2001)).
48
 47 C.F.R. 73.1920 (1967) (repealed 2000). The obligation to air opposing perspec-
tives without compensation, if necessary, began in 1963. See In re Responsibility Under the
Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 576, 576 (1963).
49
 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.").
5° Gayle S. Ecabert, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Constitutional Reevaluation of
Content BasalBroadcasting Regulations, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1000-01, 1010 (1988)
31 In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Con-
cerning the General Fairness doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d
142 (1985) [hereinafter Inquiryl.
92 In re the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public In-
terest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 7 (1974).
63 Inquiry, supra note 51, at 167, 188-96; see also Richard Samson, Note, Repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine: Prologue to a Farce, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 663, 663 (1989) ("IFlierce oppo-
nents ... Lasserted1 that the 'chilling effect' of the policy has effected precisely the result it
was intended to prevent.").
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light of the "explosive growth in various communications technolo-
gies" available in the marketplace, the public would not suffer from
the lack of diverse perspectives. 54
Although the FCC did not repeal the fairness doctrine at this
time, the handwriting was on the wall. In 1987, after the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia held that the doctrine was not
codified by Section 315(a), 55 Congress sent President Reagan a bill
that would have made the doctrine federal law. 56 Reagan vetoed the
bill, allowing the FCC to kill the doctrine, which is exactly what it did.
In a remand from the D.C. Court of Appeals in another case that di-
rected the FCC to consider a broadcaster's claim that the fairness doc-
trine impinged on its free-speech protections, the FCC concluded in
part that the fairness doctrine unconstitutionally "chilled" rather than
promoted speech because it discouraged broadcasters from ailing
controversial issues. 51 As elaborated by the FCC:
[A]lthough the [fairness] doctrine was adopted to promote
robust discussion of controversial issues, the enforcement of
the doctrine has actually had the net effect of reducing
rather than enhancing, the discussion of controversial issues
of public importance and, therefore violated the constitu-
tional principles announce by the Supreme Court. . . . Con-
sequently, while the doctrine was intended to enhance First
Amendment principles, the FCC determined that, in fact, it
had the exact opposite result. 58
" Inquiry, supra note 51, at 197.
55 Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
rehk denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
58 S. Res. 742, 100th Cong., 133 CONG. REC. 8438 (1987).
57 In re Syracuse Peace Council , 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50 (1987), reconsideration denied,
3 F.C.0 R. 2035 (1988); see also Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity A New Paradigm
for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcasting Regulation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1703
(1997).
• 55 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Mass Media Action: FCC Ends
Enforcement of Fairness Doctrine, Report No. MM-263 (Aug. 4, 1987) (on file with
author) !hereinafter FCC News]. The FCC had declined to entertain a Syracuse television
station's claim that the fairness doctrine impinged on its free speech rights. The station
had refused to broadcast opposition to a nuclear power plant after the station had aired
support for the plant. The Court of Appeals remanded the case, holding that the FCC had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider the broadcaster's assertion. See
Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 865-869 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Was the FCC's determination of a legal backfire substantiated by
the facts? The Commission's decision was based on the record in one
case, comments from interested parties, and its 1985 Fairness Report,
which the FCC termed "a comprehensive study of the administration
and effects of the doctrine on broadcast journalists."59
 Still, these ma-
terials failed to shed much light on the fairness doctrine's actual ef-
fect on stations' broadcast decisions. Much of the FCC's case against
the fairness doctrine centered on whether the increase in outlets for
broadcasting diminished the problem of "spectrum scarcity" so that
the First Amendment could no longer justify the regulation of broad-
caster's speech. 60
 When the FCC turned to the question of whether
broadcasters aired more or less controversial issues as a result of the
fairness doctrine, it largely relied on the Fairness Report, which, in
turn, focused not on empirical evidence but on the presumed eco-
nomic incentive for broadcasters to avoid controversial views. 0
Moreover, the FCC failed to account for the possibility that broadcast-
ers would resist the strategy of offering bland, uninteresting pro-
gramming because such programming would yield lower ratings and
revenues. Even less persuasive were the surveys of self-interested
broadcasters, who were asked how the fairness doctrine affected them
and who testified in large measure about the rather vague "climate of
timidity and fear" created by the fairness doctrine. 62
59 FCC News, supra note 58.
60 Id. In addition, a member of the FCC asserted that the increase in broadcasters
would solve the problem of bias: "With over 11,000 broadcasters, the chance of bias not
being countered ... [is] small ...." Id. Separate Statement of Chairman Dennis R. Patrick
Proponents of the fairness doctrine countered, citing concerns about "concentrations of
ownership" and the "First Amendment rights of the audience." Tom Shales, Regulation
Dropped by a Renegade FCC, IntAcA J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 10A; see also Rhonda Brown, Ad Hoc
Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and Radio, 6 YALE L. & Poev Rev.
449, 459-59 (1988) (Senate committee found the FCC's fairness doctrine "findings 'factu-
ally flawed'").
61 See supra note 53, and accompanying text; see also Syracuse Peace Council 2 F.C.C.R. at
5049. The Fairness Report notes the "substantial danger that many broadcasters are inhib-
ited" by the fairness doctrine. Inquiry, supra note 51, at 167.
62 Inquiry, supra note 51, at 171. The FCC seemed troubled by the "self serving" nature
of the broadcasters' testimony, but failed to respond very persuasively. For example, it
stated that the evidence was "more probative than the statements of persons who, by ne-
cessity, have to second-guess the broadcaster's state of mind." Ai at 180. In the Syracuse
Peace Council decision, the FCC reported "over 60 reported instances" of inhibition. Syra-
cuse Peace Council 2 F.C.C.R. at 5050; see also Samson, supra note 53, at 670 (citing Inquiry,
supra note 51, at 180-81).
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Moreover, information began to surface that the fairness doc-
trine did not inhibit broadcasters. For example, some legislators ex-
pressed outrage over the FCC's decision because it conflicted with
Congress's intent to preserve the doctrine, because the networks con-
tinued a ban on paid editorials during network programming even
after the repeal,63 and because the FCC's backfire allegation was un-
supported.64 In fact, one legislator called the assertion of the chilling
effect of the fairness doctrine "an issue that doesn't exist. " 65 In addi-
tion, television network officials, who had opposed the doctrine, then
predicted its repeal would have little effect. One executive of a lead-
ing network opined, "in all honesty I cannot think of an instance in
which the fairness doctrine ever inhibited us."66 Another broadcaster
stated: "This will have no effect on the day-to-day operations of ABC
news."67 Admittedly anecdotal, as admissions against interest, these
statements at minimum called into question the fairness doctrine's
effect.
During, the mid-nineties, efforts to revive the fairness doctrine
were in limbo.68 Proponents continued to press for reinstatement of
the doctrine, with little success.69 As might be expected, assertions
about the effect of repeal of the fairness doctrine soon sounded the
rhetoric of backfire too, with one Senator claiming that repeal did not
produce the airing of more factious issues." Instead, the Senator as-
serted, broadcasters produced more entertainment shows at the ex-
" Brown, supra note 60, at 469-70 (networks feared that editorials would conflict with
programming and offend the audience).
" See Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Blow for Citizen Access, 41 FED.
Comm. L.J. 161, 182 (1989) (judges reviewing the FCC's Syracuse Peace Council decision
"'perplexed' by the Commission's failure to explain its basis for finding that the !fairness
doctrine's1 net effect was to reduce the coverage of controversial issues."); Shales, supra
note 60, at 10A.
65 Shales, supra note 60, at 10A (quoting Rep. John Dingell).
66 Peter J. Boyer, Praise and Denunciation Greets Ruling by FCC, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1987,
at C26 (quoting Lawrence K. Grossman, then president of NBC News).
67 Id. (quoting ABC spokesperson, Julie Hoover).
68 See Judith Michaelson, Effort to Revive Broadcasting's Fairness Doctrine Raises Static, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A5.
See id
'm Id. (quoting chairman of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee,
Sen. Ernest Hollings.
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pense of public issues. 71 As of this writing, the possibility of the resur-
rection of the fairness doctrine appears slim."
3. CAFE Standards
In the early 1970s, long gasoline lines and a dramatic increase in
gas prices because of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries' oil embargo" convinced Congress to pass the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA),74 for the purpose of decreasing United
States' dependence on foreign oil." The EPCA imposed "corporate
average fuel economy" (CAFE) standards on automobile manufactur-
ers of cars sold in the United States." CAFE set forth minimum fuel
efficiency standards for a manufacturer's entire fleet of vehicles sold
in the U.S. 77 CAFE required the Secretary of Transportation to set the
"maximum feasible average fuel economy level" by considering,
among other things, technology, economics, other motor vehicle fuel
efficiency standards, and the U.S.'s energy conservation needs." Con-
gress itself set the initial CAFE standard at 18 miles per gallon for
1978 models79
 and 27.5 for 1985 and later. 8° The EPCA treated light
71 Id. But see Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet? Lessons from
FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rxv. 35, 41 (1997)
("[E[xplosion in news, talk and public affairs formats in both AM and FM is powerful evi-
dence that the FCC's previous efforts to regulate broadcast content did indeed result in a
'chilling effect.'").
72 See Michaelson, supra note 68, at A5.
73 See DAVID BOREN ET AL., ENERGY POLICY: A NEW WAR BETWEEN THE STATES? 8, 13,
26 (1975).
74
 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-32919 (2002)).
75 Automobile Fuel Economy and Research and Development: Hearings on S. 307, S. 499, S.
633, and Amendment 15, 5.654, and S. 783 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong.,
3-4 (1975).
7° See J. Yost Conner, Jr., Note, Revisiting CAFE: Market Incentives to Greater Automobile
Efficiency, 16 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 429, 430 (1997).
77 See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 1 21 n.3 (1986) (de-
scribing formula as "harmonic weighted" for a manufacturer's entire fleet).
78 49 U.S.C. § 32902(1). For an example of another fuel efficiency standard, see the
"Gas Guzzler Tax," 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (2002), which taxes manufacturers for vehicles falling
below a miles per gallon standard set by the Environmental Protection Agency. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4064.
7°
 Implementation of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy Power of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 7 (1995) (testi-
mony of Barry Felrice, Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards, Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT) [hereinafter Implementation of CAPE
Hearing of 1995J.
8° See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b).
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trucks, minivans, and sport utility vehicles differently, with Congress
again preempting the Secretary's discretion and setting the CAFE
standard at 20.7 in 1996. 81
Many analysts have measured the effects of CAFE by setting forth
"import dependence curves," which subtract the U.S.'s own oil pro-
duction from overall oil consumption." According to this measure,
the U.S. imported about 40% of its oil in 1977, with a slow decline to
25% by 1985. After 1985, however, the U.S. import of oil has steadily
increased up to more than 50% in 1994, with projections even higher
for the beginning of the new millennium." Such statistics have led to
the belief among critics that CAFE standards have not contributed to
a reduction in oil imports."
In fact, critics contend that CAFE has backfired and attribute the
increase in the U.S.'s dependence on foreign oil, at least in part, to
several causes related to CAFE." First, as the energy crisis eased and
drivers lost the incentive to purchase fuel efficient vehicles, they be-
gan to buy light trucks and sports utility vehicles, which have relaxed
CAFE standards." Some critics even intimated that drivers turned to
these vehicles because of the undesirable characteristics of high
En implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1993, supra note 79 (testimony of Felrice). Light
trucks are given special treatment by Congress because farmers and rancher were their
principal purchasers. National Security & Strategies for Reducing Oil Imparts: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Resources, 109th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Daniel F. Becker, Director
Global Warming & Energy Program, Sierra Club); see also Conner, supra note 76, at 443
n.101. CAFE imposes civil penalties on manufactures who fail to comply. 49 U.S.C.
§ 32912(b).
82 Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 19 (testimony of Andrew H.
Card, Jr., President & CEO, Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n.).
83 Miscellaneous Energy Policy and Conservation Act Bills: Healing Before the Senate Comm. On
Energy and Natural Resources, 105th Cong. 7-10 (1997) (testimony of Sen. Daniel K Akaka,
graph included).
" See Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79 (testimony of Diane K.
Steed, President, Coalition for Vehicle Choice).
85
 "Wit 1994 oil imports were 45% compared to 35% in 1973." Implementation of CAFE
Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 19 (testimony of Card).
88
 Motor Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 101st Cong. 313 (1989) (testimony of BMW) there-
inafter  1989 Hearings]; Conner, supra note 76, at 439. SUVs and light trucks comprise 50%
of the new vehicle market. See National Security and Strategies for Reducing Oil Imports: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Resources (testimony of Becker). As of early 2001, Iflederal
figures show the fuel economy of the nation's fleet of cars and light trucks is at its lowest
level in two decades, due largely to the increasing popularity of light trucks, a category that
includes pickups, sport-utility vehicles and minivans." Jim VandeHei, GOP Warns GM, Auto
Industry About Fuel-Efficiency Standards, WALL ST. J., June 21,2001, at A4.
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efficiency automobiles. 87 Second, consumers increased their vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) 88 as their "cost per mile" of driving decreased
due to a decrease in the real cost of fuel 89 and the greater fuel
efficiency of their cars.9° CAFE's great mistake, opponents alleged, was
targeting manufacturers instead of consumers because "driving is
much more influential on the national fuel consumption than the
measured MPG rating of any car or fleet of cars." 91 Because CAFE
does not require consumers to bear the costs of greater consumption
of oil, the law was bound to fai1. 92 Third, because CAFE caused auto-
makers to raise their prices, some drivers kept or purchased old,
inefficient cars instead of new ones." Fourth, CAFE "inhibited" auto-
makers from improving fuel efficiency beyond the CAFE standards
87 See 1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 312 (testimony of BMW).
" VMT consists of the total number of miles traveled by all vehicles. OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPROVING AUTOMOBILE FUEL ECONOMY: NEW
STANDARDS, NEW APPROACHES 39 (1991). Driver behavior and the number of drivers on
the road determine the VMT. Id. at 41.
89
 See Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 17 (testimony of Card);
1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 164 fig.1 (testimony of Hal Bracken, Group Vice President,
Customer Relations & U.S. Products, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.).
99
 Although critics apparently have not focused on the fact that ftiel efficiency reduces
the cost of driving and, therefore, contributes to an increase in vehicle miles traveled, this
is the logical extension of their argument that, as costs go down, driving increases. See 1989
Hearings, supra note 86, at 313 (testimony of BMW) ("If anything, the improved fuel econ-
omy induced more driving.").
The vehicle miles traveled increased 127% between 1970 and 1997. Clean Air & Wet-
lands Budget Hearing: Hearing Before the Senate Comm, on Environment & Public Works, 109th
Cong. (2000) (testimony of Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and
Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). The New York Times reports that the
number of miles traveled by vehicles declined in 2000 after 20 years of increases. Econo-
mists and other transportation experts believe that increases in fuel prices have caused the
decrease. Matthew L. Wald, Despite More Cars, Miles Fall For the First Time in 20 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2,2001, at Al2.
91 Auto Fuel Efficiency Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation &
Power of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce 98th Cong. 175 (1983) (testimony of Martin
L. Anderson, Executive Officer, Future of the Auto. Program, Mass. Inst. of Tech.); see also
id. at 176 ("most international policies related to fuel consumption have been directed at
consumer behavior"); infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
92
 See Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 19 (testimony of Card);
Conner, supra note 76, at 439; see also 1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 312 (testimony of
BMW).
93
 1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 312 (testimony of BMW); Conner, supra note 76, at
439-440; see also Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 15 (testimony of
Felrice).
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"for fear that such improved performance might become a new, on-
erous benchmark for future requirements."94
Nevertheless, supporters maintain that "there can be no doubt
about the energy conservation effects of improved fuel economy lev-
els.”96 Supporters point to the improvement in the average fuel econ-
omy levels of new passenger car fleets between 1975 and 1993 and
show that, although vehicle miles traveled increased by over 60% be-
tween 1975 and 1993, drivers consumed 2% less fuel traveling those
miles.96 Moreover, notwithstanding the U.S.'s increased dependence
on foreign oil, supporters insist that without CAFE our need would be
even greater. 97 The appropriate test of CAFE is not whether the U.S.
uses more imported oil after CAFE's promulgation, but whether the
rate of increase in oil imports slowed because of the law. Despite loss
of faith even by early supporters and drafters of CAFE, 98 the assertion
that CAFE has diminished the rate of increase has never been dis-
proved, contradicted, or even directly addressed by opponents.
B. Summary
Subsection A of this section sets forth three prominent examples
of legal backfire assertions. These instances of backfire are hardly iso-
lated.99 In fact, claims of legal backfire are very common. 199
Critics of a law employing the legal backfire strategy assert not
that a law's costs outweigh its benefits or that a law did not accomplish
its goals, but that a law achieves a result directly contrary to one of the
principal short or long-term goals intended,iln It is not that the Endan-
94 1989 Hearing, supra note 86, at 268 (comments of American Suzuki Motor Corp.).
"Although its supporters assert that [CAFE] is the best approach to improving automobile
fuel efficiency, in fact it would undermine fuel efficiency goals in several ways." Id.
95 Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1993, supra note 79, at 7 (testimony of Felrice)
(from 16.2 to 28.2 mpg).
" Id.; see also 1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 75 (testimony ofjamesi MacKenzie, Sen-
ior Assoc., Climate, Energy & Pollution Program, World Resources Inst.) (since 1973 VMT
increased 33%, but gasoline use increased only by 10%).
97 Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 7 (testimony of Felrice); id
at 25 (testimony of Clarence M. Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety, that CAFE "re-
duced oil consumption by 3 million barrels per day").
99 See id. at 3 (testimony of Rep. John D. Dingell ("with the benefit of .. experience I
think it is appropriate for us to ask whether [CAFE] is functioning as it should or
whether there should be a change in the basic statute").
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10° See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
101 Critics who claim a legal backfire also often focus on the costs of a law, of course.
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gered Species Act impedes development, a cost of the law to be
weighed against its benefits, but that it actually contributes to the de-
struction of endangered species and is therefore bankrupt. 102
Not surprisingly, the examples discussed above show that parties
whose oxes are being gored by a law, such as landowners, broadcast-
ers, and automakers, often author the claim of backfire. But the
sources of such claims are by no means limited to affected groups.
Those philosophically opposed to a law may originate or take up a
claim. 103 Moreover, backfire claimants represent the entire political
spectrum and diverse occupations, including lobbyists, lawmakers,
journalists, lawyers, and legal theorists. 04 Finally, critics employ vari-
ous modes of communicating backfire claims, including through the
media, in hearings, and in debates.
What is striking about most legal backfire claims is the absence of
persuasive proof of the assertions one way or the other, notwithstand-
ing the allure of the arguments. A backfire claim helped defeat the
fairness doctrine despite limited knowledge concerning the doctrine's
instrumental effects."5 The futures of the Endangered Species Act
and CAFE standards are also in jeopardy in part because of backfire
claims, despite the empirical indeterminacy of the effect of these
laws. 106 The attractiveness and rhetorical power of backfire claims, de-
spite their inconclusiveness, are the subjects of Parts II and III.
II. THE ALLURE OF LEGAL BACKFIRE RHETORIC
For too many reasons, legal backfire arguments are pervasive.
This section sets forth the major reasons. First and most important,
backfire rhetoric is persuasive, more convincing than it should be.
Second, backfire arguments are easy to make. Typically, the lack of
empirical evidence or convincing theoretical proof of the effect of a
1°2 See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
1" For example, legal theorists have claimed that the unconscionability doctrine,
which polices the fairness of contract terms, backfires. They contend that, although inef-
fectual, the doctrine allows privileged parties to assert the fairness of contract law and
therefore to preserve unfair terms. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Lau; With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,622 (1982).
104
	 example, conservatives claimed the fairness doctrine backfired and liberals as-
serted the repeal was itself a backfire. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
1°6 See supra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.
106 See Part I A.
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law allows a backfire adherent to author the claim with relative impu-
nity. Third, assertions of backfire are easy to support. Claimants can
select from a whole range of problems with promulgating successful
laws. Of course, these latter two factors—lack of evidence one way or
the other and myriad hurdles to effective lawmaking—also allow for
more general criticisms of a law, for example, that it is ineffectual or
its costs outweigh its benefits. These factors particularly add strength
to the rhetorical appeal of a backfire argument by making the asser-
tion seem more credible and understandable. In short, backfire ar-
guments are effective, easy to make and support, and hard to refute.
A. The Rhetorical Appeal of Backfire Arguments
Although lawmakers should depend on moral, economic, social,
and institutional reasons, among others, for creating, revising, or ex-
punging a law, the nature of the language chosen by supporters and
critics to convey their ideas may also influence decision makers.'"
"[L]anguage shapes thought . . . [the] choice of words can therefore
have political and social consequences . . . . 9'108
Backfire rhetoric is a good example. By pronouncing the worst
possible outcome for a law, the rhetoric is dramatic and ironic—the
Endangered Species Act is supposed to save endangered species, but
it is killing them. 109 Backfire rhetoric is also forceful in that it conveys
the feeling that there is nothing left to debate. The fairness doctrine
shuts off dialogue about controversial issues instead of promoting dis-
cussion, so the law must be expunged."° Backfire proponents also
gain credibility by identifying with the goals and hence the values of a
law's supporters: "We are all on the same side. We want to protect
consumers too, but this law simply will drive up prices and reduce
their choices."" Cost/benefit arguments, on the other hand, devalue
opponents' goals by focusing on their costs.
107 See Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct With an Obligation" and the "Normative Ambiguity of
Rhetorical Power," 56 Onto ST. LJ. 775,810 (1995); see also id. at 811 MAI n important in-
gredient or catalyst in achieving legal change is the availability and use of some powerful
rhetoric to propel courts confidently toward new methods and approaches.").
108
 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATuitE; A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 311
(1988).
1 °° See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 44-72 and accompanying text.
111 See GARTH S. JowErr Sc VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 290-
291 (3d ed. 1999); DOUGLAS WALTON, AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS 28-31 (1998). it hardly
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Notwithstanding their identification with the goals of a law's sup-
porters, backfire arguments constitute emotional appeals that empha-
size the absolute wrong-headedness of the methods a law employs to
reach its goals. 112 As such, backfire rhetoric naturally calls into ques-
tion the knowledge and skills of a law's supporters. Such emotional
arguments may be very difficult to refute both because of the reluc-
tance of debaters to confront them—"[I]t is very difficult to disagree
with an emotional and horrifying story"—and because of their impact
on the audience.'"
Backfire arguments also tell a good story and therefore capture
the attention of the audience. What could be more interesting than a
tale about a law that does exactly the opposite of what it is supposed
to do? Yet, backfire argumentation is deceptively simple and focused.
As with good advertising, the backfire argument reduces to a core
idea embodied in an interesting slogan: 114 Consumer protection legis-
lation increases prices and hurts consumers. The Fairness Doctrine
stifles speech. These are catchy sound bites, attractive to the media,
which then sends them out to the public who may take them as
authoritative. 115 To substantiate their position, critics often supple-
ment these sound bites with anecdotes or statistics, often taken out of
context or otherwise unreliable, which makes the backfire claim even
more appealing and even less reliable. 116
B. The Lack of Convincing Empirical Evidence or Theoretical Proof
Critics who adopt the powerful rhetoric of backfire are often re-
inforced by the lack of meaningful empirical or theoretical proof on
needs saying that we share with the proponents of hate crime laws the goal of a tolerant
society ...." See generally jAcms POTTER, supra note 1 (predicting a backfire because of
the ''conflict-generating tendency of identity politics").
112 Cf. DAVID G. MYERS, EXPLORING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 122-251 (2d ed. 2000) (dis-
cussing reason and emotion as the content of messages); Vaughan, supra note 9, at 584-95
(describing the vitriolic nature of right-wing assaults on the Endangered Species Act).
113 Daniel M. Filler Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76
IND. U. 315,350 (2001).
114 SeeSTEVEN D. STARK, WRITING TO WIN: THE LEGAL WRITER 61-70 (1999).
115 See, e.g., Filler, supra note 113, at 324-25 ("Legislative debate is an opportunity for
representatives to both inform the media and the public, and to shape public opinion.").
116 See id. at 353-54 (discussing the unreliable statistics on child abduction); see also su-
pra Part I and infra notes 123,197-198 and accompanying text.
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the effects of a law. 117 Put simply, critics are undaunted by the pros-
pect of being corrected by hard facts or indisputable theories.
Empirical studies of the effects of laws are difficult, costly, often
indeterminate, and, therefore, rare, but this is not the place to ana-
lyze all of the pitfalls of empirical work.118 Perhaps one example will
do. In order to investigate the frequent assertion of sellers and lessors
of consumer goods that regulation only increases prices and reduces
choice, I sought to measure the effects of New York's Motor Vehicle
Retail Leasing Act (MVRLA) on the price of auto leases in New
York.'" The MVRLA, enacted in 1994, extends to consumer lessees
certain disclosure and substantive protections, including respectively
disclosure of the basis for calculating early termination charges and
for computing excess wear and damage liability,12° and barring the
lessee from contracting away her right to assert legal remedies against
the lessor. 121 Laws comparable to the MVRLA in other jurisdictions
made comparison of the price of leases in states with and without leas-
ing regulations problematic. Instead, I sought to compare lease prices
in New York before and after the enactment of the MVRLA. Substan-
tial methodological problems involving how to account for other pos-
sible reasons for changes in lease prices impeded this analysis too. For
example, prices may fluctuate because of changes in federal law af-
fording similar protections, 122 changes in the demand for cars,
changes in the popularity of leasing versus purchasing automobiles,
and inflation and other federal monetary policy decisions. I have in-
terviewed several automobile dealers and finance companies and sent
out questionnaires regarding the effect of the MVRLA. But these data
consist of self-serving opinions of questionable reliability.
117 See generally Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholar-
ship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (2002); John Monahan & Laurens Walker,
Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 569 (1991); Peter
Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 391 LEGAL EOM. 323 (1989).
no See supra note 117.
lig N.Y. PEAS. PROP. § 330-353 (McKinney's 1999).
120 Id. §§ 337 5, 343 2.
121 Id. § 337 14 (d),
in See, e.g., Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; U.C.C. § 2A (1998); Ken-
neth J. Role & Thomas K. itiffernbruch, State Laws Response to the New Regulation M, 53 Bus.
Law. 1027, 1027-40 (1998).
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Suffice it to say, then, that empirical studies of this nature are
rare and persuasive ones even more infrequent. 125 Without convinc-
ing evidence one way or another, critics can lambaste disfavored laws
with claims of backfire almost with impunity. In fact, often combatants
engage in backfire wars, with one side claiming the evidence demon-
strates a backfire, and the other side insisting the evidence proves the
law's success. 124 Typically, neither side's evidence is very persuasive.
For example, one commentator has asserted that the warranty of
habitability, a law designed to protect residential lessees, drives land-
lords out of the housing market and therefore decreases available
housing and raises rents for lower income persons. 125 But the evi-
dence is dated and unreliable because it is based largely on opinion
and predictions. 126 Proponents of the warranty of habitability in turn
claim that the evidence proves that enforcement does not drive up
rents or reduce housing. 127
 But proponents' evidence is equally un-
persuasive, allowing critics of the warranty to mount a counter-
attack. 125
Compounding the confusion, legal backfire rhetoric is also a fac-
ile strategy because of the complexity of law. Particular laws have both
proximate and long-term, and practical and aspirational purposes and
goals, some of which are especially conducive to the legal backfire at-
tack. 129 For example, one direct goal of hate crime legislation is to
123
	 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 409 ("empirical assessments of the consequences of
regulation remain in a primitive state"). Because empirical work is so thin, the occasional
published study may gain more attention than warranted, especially if it includes "precise
quantification" that suggests "objective fact." Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE Lj. 1981, 1986 (1998).
129 See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
125 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 422-23 (citing Werner Z. Hirsch et al., Regression Analysis
of the Effects of Habitability Law upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar
Debate, 63 GAL. L. REV. 1098, 1139 (1975)).
126 Hirsch states that although results of empirical studies of housing supply and de-
mand would "be informative as to the costs and benefits of habitability laws, such estima-
tion is beyond the scope" of the article. Hirsch et al., supra note 125, at 1124.
127 See, e.g, Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 963 F. 2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (re-
lying on a Yale Law Journal study that housing code enforcement does not increase rents);
AttthonyT. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763, 773-74 (1983).
1 " See Robinson, 463 F. 2d at 860, criticized in Hirsch et al., supra note 125, at 1130; see
also Caylene J. Styve et al, Perceived Condition of Confinement: A National Evaluation offuvenile
Boot Camps and Traditional Facilities, 24 LAW & Hum. BEttAv. 297, 297 (2000) (perception of
juvenile offenders is that boot camps provide "a more positive environment," countering
criticism of other studies suggesting boot camps create hostile environment).
129
 Purposes and goals may, of course, change over time too.
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punish hate crime mongers.'" A long-term, and aspirational goal is to
demonstrate symbolically society's view of the evil of such crimes and
to change people's thinking about them.' 5' The latter goal, difficult,
perhaps impossible, to evaluate with respect to success or failure,
leaves open the counter argument that the law only increases resent-
ment and hate. 132
In the absence of persuasive empirical evidence, backfire warriors
sometimes turn to other more theoretical modes of proof. To support
the claim of backfire, recall that opponents of the fairness doctrine
applied what is essentially an economic analysis of the incentives of
broadcasters.'" For another example, consider Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code dealing with sales of goods. Consistent with
Karl Llewellyn's view of the importance of facilitating commerce by
incorporating contextual realities in resolving disputes about the par-
ties' intentions, Article 2 directs court to interpret agreements with an
eye towards any applicable trade custom and the parties' dealings. 134
Critics of this approach rely on economic analysis to support their
claim that Article 2's contextual orientation ironically backfires be-
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history,
is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a
formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears,
but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgot-
ten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted
for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to
reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to
the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
'" See infra Part IV.
' 31 See infra Part IV.
152 See infra Part IV. For another example, the proximate goal of the Clean Air Act is to
reduce auto emissions by setting limits for new cars. A more long-term aspiration is to im-
prove the public's health by cleaning the air. Although the reduction in emissions can be
measured, it will be very difficult to determine the extent to which the air became cleaner
and health improved as the result of new-car emission reduction. As a result, critics can
claim that the Clean Air Act only encouraged the use of old cars, thereby increasing air
pollution and damaging health. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 418. For still another exam-
ple, boot camps for juvenile offenders are meant to keep juveniles out of jail, decrease
costs of juvenile penal rehabilitation, and decrease recidivism. Reports arc surfacing that
boot camps have backfired at least with respect to the rehabilitation goal. See, e.g., Rod
Smith, Toward a More Utilitarian juvenile Court System, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. Pot.'v 237, 244-
45 (1999).
7" See supra notes 53, 61 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shaltar, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Tentative Case Against
Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI, L. Rev. 781, 781 (1999).
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cause it creates incentives for parties to be inflexible and uncoopera-
tive.' Critics reason that under Article 2 a party incurs significant
costs by being flexible—i.e., by not insisting on performance accord-
ing to the express contract terms.'" By agreeing to late performance,
for example, a party creates a "course of performance" and therefore
loses not only the immediate benefits of performance on time but
also the right to enforce the time-for-performance term in future per-
formances of the same contract.ls" This extra cost would not exist in a
legal regime that enforced contracts as written regardless of a party's
acceptance of late performance. Hence, to avoid such extra costs, par-
ties must be more rigid under Article 2 than under a law that ignored
the parties' course of perforn-tance."8
Although a very interesting academic argument, the "rigidity"
theory should not alone constitute the basis for sustaining a claim of a
legal backfire. Determining the incentive effects of Article 2's contex-
tual approach requires a richer analysis of people's behavior. The
costs of rigidity are likely to be high—consider, for example, the costs
associated with alienating the party who requests to perform late—
and a low-cost alternative exists, namely acceding to the request while
reserving the right to performance on time in the future.'" Further,
parties may voluntarily accede to a defective performance in part be-
cause they believe that people should be flexible and cooperate and in
part because they believe that the benefits of being flexible (which
include future accommodations of their own needs by the other
party) outweigh the costs. 140 Not only will parties therefore likely re-
135 See id.
' 36 See id.
137 See id.
ma See id.
139 A verbal protest should do. See U .C.C. § 2-208(1) ("any course of performance ac-
cepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement") [emphasis added]. Moreover, courts do not appear to make many errors in
determining when to establish a course of performance. See Robert A. Hillman, More in
Defense of UCC Methodology, 62 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). But see Lisa Bernstein, Mer-
chant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144
U. PA. L. Rev. 1765, 1813 (1996) (it will be "difficult" for parties to "negate the influence"
of their conduct on how courts interpret contracts).
14° Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE U. 1, 5-6; see also Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Contract: Price
Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 527, 532; Robert A. Hillman, The Limits
of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 717, 724-25 (2000).
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main flexible under Article 2, but the costs to the parties of an alter-
native legal approach might be much higher. Consider the costs of
entering legally enforceable contract modifications in a regime that
ignored course of performance. For example, parties would have to
plan and draft a new express contract each time they sought to alter
the time for performance by a few days or face the possibility of judi-
cial error in assessing their oral agreement to that effect. Without a
writing or consideration, which is not necessary to modify a sales con-
tract (but which is a primary source of evidence of an intention to
contract), courts may be prone to make such mistakes.
At this point, the reader may wonder how a critic claiming a
backfire can convince lawmakers if she lacks empirical proof and pol-
icy analysis is unpersuasive. That is just the point. Without convincing
proof of some kind, the backfire claimant's argument is hollow and
lawmakers should therefore be wary of it. This does not mean that
lawmakers should ignore the argument. Instead, as I develop more
fully in Part IV, lawmakers simply should be on guard to resist giving it
more credence than it deserves.
C. The Illusiveness of Achieving Instrumental Goals
Crafting laws is an uncertain science. Laws may fail to achieve
their purposes for hosts of reasons. 141 What follows is not an inventory
and analysis of all of the things that can go wrong, a discussion be-
yond the scope of this paper. Instead, I briefly present many of the
lawmaking problems, involving both substantive imprecision and pro-
cess constraints, that critics have implicated in their claims of backfire.
This catalog of reasons for claimed backfires shows that critics have no
trouble finding ammunition for their backfire claims, which helps ac-
count for the number of such claims.
1. Substantive Imprecision
One hurdle for lawmakers is drafting laws that are not too
difficult to implement or enforce. For example, the drafters of the
Endangered Species Act failed to find a way to alert landowners to the
listing of species without allowing them lawfully to destroy habitats
141 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1498, 1555 (1996) (different "legal cultures" construe laws differently).
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prior to the effectiveness of the law. 142 Another challenge for the same
lawmakers was to devise methods of policing landowner activity within
the constraints of limited budgetary resources." 5 It was not difficult
for critics to emphasize these problems with the ESA in making their
claims of backfire.
Lawmakers also inadvertently may create legal loopholes and
perverse incentives. For example, under our tax laws, flexible spend-
ing accounts allow workers to withhold money from their pay to cover
their medical costs for the calendar year. 144 Workers pay no income
tax on money withheld, but they forfeit the money if they do not
spend it by the end of the year." 5 Workers therefore may go on
"spending binges" prior to the end of the year to exhaust their ac-
counts. Critics therefore contend that the "use-it-or-lose-it" loophole
encourages excessive medical spending, even though a goal of the
accounts was to achieve precisely the opposite effect.'"
In addition, lawmakers may target inappropriate audiences. For
example, we saw that critics claim that lawmakers directed CAFE at
the wrong parties. 147 In economic parlance, dependence on foreign
oil constitutes a "negative externality" of oil consumption because the
group that consumes the oil, car drivers, does not incur the cost of
dependence directly. 148 Lawmakers seeking to diminish this depend-
ency cost should therefore direct the law at car drivers so that these
consumers of oil "internalize the externality," meaning they bear the
cost they impose on others. 149 But the law does not require consumers
to purchase fuel-efficient automobiles nor does it deter increases in
consumers' vehicle miles traveled by, for example, heavily taxing sales
of gasoline. 150
 Such moves may have been too politically controversial,
but the end result is that critics can claim a legal backfire.
142 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
144
 Rosenbaum, supra note 5, § 4, at 2.
145 Id.
146 Id. For other examples, the Highway Beautification Act ironically created incentives
for landowners to build as many lawful billboards as possible." Albert, supra note 5, at 998.
The "best available technology" strategy of pollution control may deter industry from in-
novating. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 420-21.
141 See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
148 Conner, ROM note 76, at 441; see also G. Henry M. Schuler, Transportation Fuels, in
U.S. ENERGY IMPERATIVES FOR THE 1990s: LEADERSHIP, EFFICIENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, AND SUSTAINED GROWTH 143,147 (Donald L. Guertin et al. eds., 1992).
148 See Conner, supra note 76, at 441.
150 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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Lawmakers may also have too much faith in their ability to
change people's attitudes and beliefs. Lawmakers can create appro-
priate incentives only if they can understand and predict human be-
havior. 151 Without sufficient care by the drafters, laws inadvertently
may impinge on the values of targeted groups or create emotional
reactions, such as fear or resentment. Predicting behavior is a heady
challenge for lawmakers and leaves them open to the claim that they
got it wrong, even wrong enough to create a legal backfire. If critics
are correct, for example, the United States economic embargo of
Cuba only shores up the Castro regime by increasing its citizens' na-
tionalism. 152 Instead of protecting cyclists, helmet laws may alarm
them enough about the dangers of bicycling to lead them to some
other even more dangerous activity.'"
Lawmakers may also fail to foresee changing circumstances and
create regrettably inflexible laws. In some instances, the environment
may be changing so rapidly that lawmaking is inadvisable. A good ex-
ample pertains to the scope provision of revised Article 2 of the UCC.
The revisers have wrestled long and hard with the problem of whether
and to what extent sale-of-goods law should apply to transactions in-
volving combined goods and computer programs.'" Such transac-
tions are not uncommon, of course, because many goods now contain
computers and computer programs, including automobiles, medical
equipment, even alarm clocks. Under current Article 2, the question
is whether the "predominant purpose" of the transaction was the sale
of goods. 155 After myriad drafts attempting to refine the test to accord
with modern technological realities, the drafters determined to pre-
serve existing law because of the fear that codifying a new approach
151 See generally infra Part IV. The importance of understanding behavior applies, of
Course, not only to understanding the general citizenry, but also to people administering
the law. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 413-16. A stringent standard—one that forbids bal-
ancing or calls for regulation to or beyond the point of 'feasibility'—makes regulators re-
luctant to act." Id. at 416.
132 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
153 James A. Henderson, Jr. kieffrey .J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Bi-
ases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 249 (2000).
154 Ann Lousin, Proposed UCC 2-103 of the 2000 Version of the Revision of Article 2, 54 SMU
L. REV. 913, 913-14, 916-19 (2001).
155 See U .C.0 § 2-102; Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 959 (8th. Cir. 1974).
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might lead to greater rather than less confusion (a legal backfire) as
technology continues to develop. 158
2. Process Hurdles
Special interests may have flexed too much muscle during the
process of creating a law."7 For example, credit card companies have
long lobbied for narrowing the protection of bankruptcy debtors who
fail to pay off their credit card bills. Debtors facing bankruptcy, on the
other hand, have more difficulty organizing and have been under
represented in the deliberations. 158
 Based on a "massive effort" by the
credit card companies "propelled by major political contributions,"
new bankruptcy law revisions make bankruptcy discharges more
156 The revisers floated a comment that provides in part: "As goods containing com-
puter programs evolve, it is likely that the courts' approach• to disputes about the goods
will also evolve. It would be premature at this point to mandate any one particular ap-
proach in this evolving area. Thus, this section takes no position on this matter." American
Law Institute Discussion Forum, Mar. 9, 2001, formerly reachable on Internet at
littp://www.ali.org/forum/forum 1 hun (no longer available because of continuing revi-
sions)
A related problem involves the difficulty of attempting to create a legal solution for
problems inherent in complex systems that contain many interdependent elements:
People's incomplete and inaccurate understanding of risk confounds efforts
to identify the system of products liability that would best encourage appro-
priate patterns of product design, production, marketing, use and consump-
tion. Liability rules affect all of these elements and they all interact with one
another. Given these realities, the regulator's task seems hopeless.
Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 153, at 213-14 (commenting on the potential backfire
of enterprise liability).
157 "Laws do not spring forth from a groundswell of public opinion, but rather are the
product of lobbying by interested (interest') groups that must mobilize support among
politicians." jAcons & PorrER, supra note 1, at 66. In fact, Sunstein points out that the
"public choice" literature suggests the absence of true legal backfires because special in-
terests desire the seemingly perverse outcome. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 429-30. For ex-
ample, the purpose of minimum wage legislation might not be to help the poor, but
rather to immunize union members from competition by people who are willing to work
for low wages by limiting entry into the labor market." Id. at 430.
158 See, e.g., William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory In-
terpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629, 638 (2001) ("large and diffuse" interests "are under
represented" because they "have difficulty organizing" due to the free-rider problem).
'59 The Miami Herald reports that "lmlembers of a coalition representing Visa,
MasterCard and banking industry groups gave more that $5 million to the two major po-
litical parties and their candidates in 1999 and 2000, a 40 percent increase from the previ-
ous presidential election, according to the Center for Responsive Politics." Harriet John-
son Brackey, Wiping Out Debt To Get Tougher, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 15, 2001, at 1C.
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difficult to achieve. 16° Some evidence suggests, however, that the irre-
sponsible distribution of credit cards by the companies caused most of
the rise in bankruptcy filings and that most debtors in bankruptcy
have suffered a legitimate financial crisis. 161 If true, the new revisions
may backfire by creating greater debtor pain in contravention of
bankruptcy law's fresh start policy.
Public opinion can also deter effective lawmaking. The role pub-
lic opinion should play in fashioning laws is, of course, very contro-
versial. Obviously lawmakers should repel fleeting sentiments that re-
sult from publicity over particular notorious occurrences such as an
unusual gruesome crime. On the other hand, when public opinion
consists of sustained, tangible alterations of perspectives, lawmakers
should not, and probably cannot, ignore it because it reflects people's
values162 and likely enters the subconscious of the lawmakers. 163 Still,
lawmakers face the challenge of attempting to distinguish fleeting
from sustained opinion and evaluating when the latter legitimately
supports particular legislation. Is public opinion unjust or illogical?
Was it formed on the basis of the pertinent facts? Did interest groups
or the media harbor too much influence? Critics of hate crime laws,
for example, insist that lawmakers have yielded to uninformed public
opinion in creating these crimes and therefore predict a legal
backfire. 164
Political compromise may constitute a necessity of lawmaking,
but it can also diminish laws so that they fail to serve their purpose or
even backfire. For example, the Highway Beautification Act may
thwart highway beautification because of the curious compromises
made with industry: "The law gave billboard operators a five-year pe-
riod in which to continue to operate nonconforming signs ... and
then, incredibly, [gave them a right] to compensation after that five-
year period ended," so that "the rational response . . . [was] to build
as many lawful billboards as possible:166 The Environmental Protec-
16° Harriet Johnson Brackey, Senate OK's Overhaul of U.S. Bankruptcy Law: Bill Limits
Shield on Homes of Debtors, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 2001, at 1A.
161 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUP"rCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 178-79,188-89 (1989).
162 See Robert A. Hillman, The New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the Process of Legal
Change, 40 B.C. L. REv. 879, 885-86 (1999); see also William Blatt, The American Dream in
Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 331 (1996).
163 See Hinman, supra note 162, at 885.
1" See infra Part IV.
165 Albert, supra note 5, at 496, 498.
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tion Agency decided to apply emissions regulation only to new cars in
part because of politics, thereby encouraging the use of old cars and,
according to critics, greater pollution. 166 The reason lawmakers di-
rected CAFE at car manufacturers and not drivers, which critics argue
created a backfire, also may have been political expediency. 167
Laws also may fail because of inadequate funding, for example,
resulting from the lack of an adequate commitment or a political
compromise. The Highway Beautification Act provided for states to
receive federal funds to compensate private billboard owners for a
portion of their lost revenue due' to state regulation.' Critics cite the
Federal government's lack of follow-through in appropriating
sufficient funds as another reason the Highway Beautification Act has
"thwarted" rather than promoted the elimination of billboards. 169
3. Summary on the Illusiveness of Achieving Instrumental Goals
None of the profusion of reasons for difficulties in lawmaking
discussed above comes close to proving that any law backfired. The
range of potential factors that might lead to a legal backfire, however,
clearly affords critics of a law abundant potential explanations that
appear to substantiate their claims. The plethora of factors therefore
helps to account for the multitude of backfire allegations—with all of
the potential supporting explanations, critics are not reticent to un-
leash a backfire claim.
Critics of a law can also latch on to more than one explanation
for a legal backfire to help increase the claim's appeal. 17° Consider
once again the allegation that the CAFE standards have backfired.
Critics have a whole arsenal of reasons to support the claim.'" As
mentioned, they can point out that CAFE is directed at the wrong par-
ties. 172 In addition, CAFE fails to account for consumers' fickleness
concerning oil prices. Although in the early 1980s consumers ex-
pressed concern about fuel efficiency, by 1982 consumers sought
larger, fuel inefficient cars "as the memory of the gasoline lines of
166 CRANDALL ET AL., supra IlOtC 77, at 89-90.
167 See Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 4 (testimony of Felrice).
168 SeeAlbert, supra note 5, at 500-06.
169 Id.
170 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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1979 fade[d]." 1 " Nor did CAFE's drafters foresee consumers' love
affair with light trucks, including minivans, SUVs, and trucks, which,
under a major loophole in the law, enjoy a lower CAFE standard:
"Mil contrast to the passenger car fleet, which is using less fuel than
in 1975, the light truck fleet is using twice as much fuel-35 billion
gallons in 1993, compared to 18 billion in 1975."174 Finally, CAFE
lawmakers did not predict that as oil prices dropped and cars became
fuel efficient, people would drive a sufficiently greater number of
miles possibly to offset any gains in fuel efficiency, and then some. 175
Each of these problems with CAFE standards may have lessened
the beneficial effects of the law or even contributed to a legal
backfire. The point is that although a backfire may be uncertain, the
host of difficulties in creating the law contributes to a perception that
the law indeed may have backfired.
III. THE COSTS OF LEGAL BACKFIRE RHETORIC
In this Part, I show that the prominence of legal backfire rhetoric
is a cause for concern. Overuse of the strategy contributes to a gen-
eral anti-regulatory environment and to the potential subversion of
beneficial laws. In addition, backfire claims distract lawmakers from
careful consideration of difficult policy issues and contribute to unsat-
isfactory responses to important legal issues.
A. The Development of an Anti
-Regulatory Environment
Legal backfire rhetoric contributes to an anti-regulatory envi-
ronment that may not be justified or helpful. The question of the ap-
propriate recipe of freedom and regulation in our law is, of course,
very controversial. On any given issue, lawmakers should resolve
whether to regulate or to defer to market forces based on a careful
review of the nature of the problem, the applicable norms and prin-
ciples, and the possibility of market failures. As a general matter, how-
ever, because of superior resources, industry critics of regulation can
best gather whatever information is obtainable about the effects of a
113 John Holusha, Bigger Cars' Worries Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1982, at § 1, part 1, at
26; see also Everett M. Ehrlich, The Problem of Oil-Import Dependence, in ENERGY-Poucv
ANALYSIS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 9, 9-10 (Raymond C. Scheppach & Everett M.
Ehrlich, eds., 1982).
174 Implementation of CAFE Hearing of 1995, supra note 79, at 8 (testimony of Felrice).
178 See 1989 Hearings, supra note 86, at 313 (testimony of BMW).
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law, control its dissemination, and frame the debate to focus on the
"economic costs and constraints" of regulation.'" Legal backfire ar-
guments constitute one important component of this strategy. Con-
stant and rhetorically charged claims of legal backfire, can influence
lawmakers directly, such as by skewing their perspectives on the na-
ture, quality, and degree of opposition to a law, or indirectly, such as
by influencing public opinion or by fanning the flames of additional
opponents of the legislation. In short, backfire rhetoric tends to cre-
ate an atmosphere that is not conducive to serious and objective con-
sideration of important issues.
Take for example, the issue of consumer protection, which arises
in many guises including product and property warranties, minimum
wage laws, and product safety laws. Almost invariably, the response of
counterposing interests has been to raise the red flag of backfire. As
mentioned previously, the warranty of habitability, if critics are to be
believed, only diminishes the availability of housing.'" Minimum
wage laws increase unemployment (thereby decreasing overall in-
come) by making labor too expensive.'" Mandatory disclosure laws
"lull" consumers into taking greater risks. 179 Although on examination
each of these assertions seem less than persuasive, consistent and well-
publicized barbs about the backfire of each and every consumer pro-
tection law can only poison the atmosphere against consumer protec-
tion in general. 180
Needless to say, input, discussion, and debate about the efficacy
of proposed or enacted laws constitute the foundation of effective
government and I do not mean to suggest stifling dialogue about the
quality of law. Instead, I want to urge participants to contribute re-
sponsibly and not to engage in what sometimes amounts to little more
than scare tactics, and to exhort lawmakers to move cautiously when
confronted with backfire claims.
06
 Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclosing the Auto
Safety Payoff 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87,120-21 (1985).
177 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
178 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 422, relying on FINIS WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES
AND EVIDENCE (1978).
179 Id. at 428-29, relying on W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of
Product Safety Regulation, 28 J.L. & Ecom 527,544,546 (1985).
188
 For example, critics of disclosure laws admit there may be many reasons for con-
sumers to take on greater risk. Viscusi, supra note 179, at 546; see also infra notes 188-189,
and accompanying text (minimum wage laws do not invariably produce greater unem-
ployment).
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B. The Defeat of Beneficial Law
The second problem with backfire rhetoric obviously flows from
the first. The ease of use and the powerful effect of legal backfire
rhetoric can mislead lawmakers and undermine their faith in existing
law that may be serving a salutary purpose. As we have seen, legal
backfire rhetoric helped bring down the FCC's long-standing Fairness
Doctrine, and contributes to the assault on the Endangered Species
Act and CAFE standards)" Such laws are no doubt controversial and
some may be unwise or even backfire. In the absence of convincing
proof, however, decision makers should be wary of legal backfire ar-
guments lest they abandon legislation that benefits or would have
benefited society. This is especially true of legislators, whose processes
do not require the same careful perusal of facts and framing of issues
as a court or administrative proceeding)"
Legal backfire rhetoric not only can turn lawmakers against
beneficial laws, it also can provide lawmakers with a convenient after-
the-fact rationalization for a decision made on other, more controver-
sial, grounds. For example, the fairness doctrine fell from grace dur-
ing the anti-regulatory environment of the Reagan years)" The FCC
began to view the airwaves as no different from any other commercial
resource that should be governed by market forces)" Although this
perspective may have been the FCC's primary or only reason for ex-
tinguishing the fairness doctrine, the FCC saw the need to disarm
fairness doctrine supporters by claiming that the fairness doctrine ac-
18I See supra Part 1; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush is Choosing Indusby Insiders to Fill
Several Environmental Positions, N.Y. Timm, May 12, 2001, at AlO; Vaughan, supra note 9, at
600 (Industry and business groups are seeking substantial amendments to the ESA in
order to weaken it for all project?).
um See EDWARD Fl. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5-6 (1949).
I" See Inquiry supra note 51 and accompanying text.
• 184 See David Chang, Selling The Market-Driven Message: Commercial Television, Consumer
Sovereignty and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 451, 480 (2000). "[A] focus on [eco-
nomic] markets reveals that direct regulation of programming is virtually always an unnec-
essary intrusion into broadcasters' rights of free speech, and that the [Federal Communi-
cations] Commission can attain truly sensible goals without overseeing stations' editorial
decisions." Id. at 457 (quoting THOMAS RRATTENMAKER & Lucas POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 45 (1994)); see also Conrad, supra note 64, at 184 (FCC at time
of the decision was expressly "pro-industry [and] anti-regulatory"). "['Television is just
another appliance. It's a toaster with pictures." Conrad, supra note 64, at 184 (quoting
former FCC Chairman Mark Fowler). Id. at 184-85.
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tually reduced the airing of controversial issues, a claim that they
could not sustain with empirical proof.
C. The Tendency to Induce "Quick Fixes"
We have seen that legal backfire argumentation is dramatic and
forceful. Lawmakers and analysts therefore may overreact by aban-
doning a careful review of a problem and by instigating quick, but
dramatic solutions, which ultimately may prove very unsatisfactory.
For example, in an interesting and provocative article, Professor Sun-
stein's stated goal was to discuss "regulatory strategies . . . that achieve
an end precisely opposite to the one intended or to the only public-
regarding justification that can be brought forward in their sup-
port."'" Although many of his examples of "regulatory strategy"
backfires lack persuasive substantiation, Sunstein nonetheless makes
some rather dramatic suggestions. 1"
For example, Sunstein claims generally that "[R]edistributive
regulation will have complex distributive consequences, and the
group particularly disadvantaged by the regulation will typically con-
sist of those who are already most disadvantaged."'" More specifically,
he asserts that "[a] n important consequence of the minimum wage is
to increase unemployment by raising the price of marginal labor; and
those at the bottom of the ladder—the most vulnerable members of
society—are the victims. "188 Sunstein's support for these propositions
185 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 407. Although Sunstein distinguishes "strategies whose
costs exceed their benefits" from "regulatory strategies ... that achieve an end precisely
opposite to the one intended," many of Sunstein's examples do not constitute legal
backfires, at least the way I have defined them. See id. For example, Sunstein discusses the
Environmental Protection Agency's decision to impose emission controls solely on new
automobiles, thereby "prolong[ing1 the use of old, dirty vehicles." Id. at 419. Although
such a strategy may have retarded the Clean Air Act's goal of reducing pollution, it did not
produce a result "precisely opposite to the one intended," for example, greater pollution.
See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 77, at 91-93 (relied on by Sunstein).
155 For example, Sunstein asserts that the EPA's "'scrubbing' strategies for new sources
of sulfur dioxide" to reduce coafturning pollution actually led to the continuance of old,
highly polluting methods, thereby "aggravating in many parts of the country the very prob-
ICIT ► it was designed to solve." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 418. But Sunstein relics on one
book whose authors merely predict that the rules will worsen the environment and that
other means could have achieved the goals more cheaply. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra
note 5, at 11-12.
187 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 423. Sunstein also writes that "efforts to redistribute re-
sources through regulation will ... have a serious perverse result." Id.
188 Id. at 422. Sunstein mentions a few qualifications. First, minimum wage laws and
other redistributive regulations may benefit the poor if part of a broader effective welfare
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is slim, 189 and recent studies tend to rebut the assertion that "a rise in
the minimum wage invariably leads to a fall in employment." 190 Sun-
stein nonetheless advocates a powerful palliative, admonishing Con-
gress not to "attempt to redistribute resources through regulation: 191
D. The Tendency to Distract
Backfire claims also distract lawmakers and analysts from pursu-
ing more pressing issues concerning a law. We have seen that legal
decision makers confront a host of issues, including the feasibility of
and appropriate strategies for implementing a law, assessing a law's
costs and benefits, and evaluating its normative justifications. For ex-
ample, should lawmakers have directed CAFE standards at automo-
bile manufacturers or drivers? Does the Endangered Species Act un-
fairly restrict property owners and stifle development? Is the Fairness
Doctrine unconstitutional? Lawmakers have enough to worry about
without having to deal with an often speculative claim of legal
backfire. Unfortunately, we have seen that backfire claims often be-
come the focus when lawmakers do their work. 192
IV. APPLICATION—DO HATE CRIMES LAWS INCREASE HATE?
In light of the previous discussion, how should lawmakers react
when opponents of a law sound the alarm of legal backfire? To re-
spond to this question with greater specificity, I consider one final ex-
ample of an alleged legal backfire, namely hate crime legislation.
Because of a perceived dramatic increase in crimes involving vio-
lence against minority groups in the 1980s and 1990s, Congress and
system. Id. Second, such laws and regulations may transform society's "preferences and
beliefs," although he doubts that they do and observes the absence of empirical evidence
on the effects of redistributive laws on public opinion. Id. at 424. More generally, Sunstein
undermines many of his claims of backfire by calling for better evidence of the magnitude
of his "regulatory paradoxes." Sunstein, supra note 4, at 431 ("[TI he minimum wage might
well be justified if its effect is the unemployment of only a few additional people.").
ISO Sunstein cites only FINIS WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978).
The publisher, the American Enterprise Institute, is a conservative "think tank."
190 DAvin CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS
or THE MINIMUM WAGE '389 (1995). Card and Krueger delineate the flaws in earlier stud-
ies and explain the authors' statistical analysis of data collected from fast-food restaurants.
Id. In a 50-state survey, minimum wage hikes increased wages without negatively affecting
employment rates. Id.
191 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 432.
"2 See infra sections I–III and accompanying text.
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state legislatures promulgated "hate crime" laws that in one common
permutation increase sentences for crimes "motivated ... by racial,
ethnic, national origin, [or] sexual orientation prejudice." 193 Notwith-
standing the laudatory goals of such laws, they have created
significant controversy over, among other things, whether hate crimes
have increased,'" whether hate crime laws are justified under any
theory of punishment, 195 whether they impinge on free speech, and
what they accomplish. 196 All of these are serious and important argu-
ments about the costs and benefits of hate crime laws that are worthy
of further study. Here, I focus on an additional argument of critics,
that hate crime laws "will actually do harm" because they will
backfire . 197
Critics assert that hate crime laws will backfire both with respect
to their proximate goals of punishing and deterring wrongdoers and
to their long-term goal of reducing prejudice in society. 198 Concerning
the goals of punishing and deterring wrongdoers, 1" an important fo-
cus of critics of the legislation is on the requirement that prosecutors
prove the motive behind an attack, namely that the perpetrator of a
crime intentionally sought the victim because of race or other differ-
ence. 2°0 The requirement of proving motivation leads to many ques-
Jacons & PorrER, supra note 1, at 40. Other categories are substantive crimes; civil
rights statutes; and reporting statutes. Id. at 29.
14 See infra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
195
 In what way is a crime committed against an individual, because of the individual's
personal characteristics, deserving of greater punishment than a similar crime committed
against another individual?" Craig L. Uhrich, Hate Crime Legislation: A Policy Analysis, 36
lions. L. REV. 1467, 1505 (1999). Commentators have contributed several justifications,
including the ''expressive value of punishment," the greater culpability of perpetrators, the
greater harm to victims, the vulnerability of victims, and the greater immorality of hate
crinies; we also Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Founda-
tions of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016-18 (1997); Frederick M. Lawrence,
The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV.
320, 321 (1994). See generally Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expres-
sive Lama or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1229 n.5 (2000) (compiling
authors' perspectives).
196
 See, e.g., Uhrich, supra note 195, at 1476-77.
19" Marc Fleisher, Down the Passage Which 1%'e Should Not Take: The Folly of Hate Crime Leg-
islation, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1994).
198 See Jacoas & PorrEn, supra note 1, at 8, 130 (mentioning goals).
199 The theories supporting enhanced punishment of hate crime mongers coincide
with general theories of punishment, namely retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and deterrence. See generally Uhrich, supra note 195, at 1489-1521.
299 Fleisher, supra note 197, at 2. A typical statute subjects defendants to additional
punishment when the victim was Intentionally selected ... because of the race, religion,
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tions: "If a white mugs a black and delivers a slur in the process, is it a
'hate crime' or an ordinary mugging with a gratuitous slur at-
tached?”261 Critics believe that sorting out such issues will "compli-
cate" the trial and actually "impede" justice by making convictions and
punishment of perpetrators less likely. 202
Perhaps even more serious, critics of hate crime laws see the mak-
ings of a legal backfire with respect to the long-term goal of increas-
ing social harmony. As a general matter, critics argue that It] he new
hate crime laws . . . redefine the crime problem as yet another arena
for conflict between races, genders, and nationality groups." 205 Critics
believe the laws will "contribute to splintering our society" by creating
an exaggerated view of the frequency of such crimes. 204 Critics also
claim that hate crime statistics create the impression that non-
criminals share the sentiments of perpetrators, such as when spokes-
persons cite violence against black churches as evidence of wide-
spread bigotry in society.206 Moreover, theorists assert that hate crime
laws will create controversy and conflict over what prejudices should
constitute hate crimes and what incidents should be prosecuted. 206 As
a result of these problems with hate crime laws, critics claim that in-
stead of reducing intolerance, hate crime legislation will exacerbate
it. 207 In addition, instead of increasing society's confidence in our sys-
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person." Id. at 4,
quotingWis. STAT. § 939.645 (1990); see also JAcous & POTTER, supra note 1, at 40-4L
201 John Leo, The Politics of Hate, U.S NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 9, 1989, at 24,
quoted in JAcoes & POTTER, supra note 1, at 4.
202 See JAcons Porrust, supra note 1, at 8, 109. In addition, critics predict that, be-
cause of outrage in the victim's community, prosecutors will be unable to resist filing un-
warranted charges, or that prosecutors will turn bias crimes against the people they were
designed to protect. Id. at 134 (discussing "black racism"); see id at 109.
2°s Id. at 5.
404 Id. at 132. Hate crime laws might promote a "balkanization of society instead of
promoting "our common civic culture." Id. at 132 (quoting Jim SLEEPER, IN DEFENSE OF
CIVIC CULTURE at 2 (Washington, D.C. Progressive Foundation, 1993)).
405 Id. at 135-36.
406 Id. at 132-34, 137-42. For example, they supply several anecdotes of "jurisdiction
politicking" about what should be included as a hate crime. Id. at 133.
467 See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 1, at 10.
Our concern is that rewriting criminal law to take into account the racial, re-
ligious, sexual, and other identities of offenders and victims will undermine
the criminal law's potential for bolstering social solidarity. By redefining
crime as a facet of intergroup conflict, hate crime laws encourage citizens to
think of themselves as members of identity groups and encourage identity
groups to think of themselves as victimized and besieged, thereby hardening
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tern of criminal justice, hate crime laws may undermine it. 208 For crit-
ics, the only logical conclusion is to repeal hate crime statutes, 209
 or at
least to define hate crimes as narrowly as possible. 21°
How should lawmakers react to the claims that hate crime laws
will diminish justice and increase intolerance? Because of the propen-
sity of critics of laws to author legal backfire claims of this nature, be-
cause of their rhetorical appeal, and because of their extraordinary
nature, lawmakers should proceed with caution and should resist
overreacting to the backfire claims. Analysts should begin by gather-
ing and evaluating whatever hard evidence exists on whether hate
crime laws are likely to impede or promote the conviction of wrong-
doers and increase or reduce the divisions in society. As with other
backfire claims, however, this process likely will be inconclusive, at
best. 211 Lawmakers should also consider and evaluate the economic,
psychological, sociological, or, for that matter, any other type of policy
reasoning that sheds light on these backfire claims. 212
Critics of hate crime laws seem most persuasive when they discuss
the difficulties of implementing the laws. For example, can juries ef-
fectively sort out whether a crime was racially motivated? 2" This issue
obviously impacts on whether the laws can achieve justice in individ-
ual cases, but it is also pertinent to the question of the effect of hate
crime laws on intolerance. After all, serious injustices in the results of
each group's sense of resentment. That in turn contributes to the balkaniza-
don of American society, not to its unification.
Id. at 131; see also id. at 132.
2°8 Id. at 3; see also id. at 147.
209 Id. at 147 ("We do not believe that across-the-board sentence enhancement for hate
crimes can be justified.").
210 Id. at 146-47.
24 See id. at 9. Practically nothing is known about the incidence of hate crimes ...."
Id.; see also id. at 47-48,59, infra notes 221-222, supra Section II B. Although I focus on
certain instrumental effects of hate crime laws, the reader should not discount other issues
pertaining to whether to retain the laws. For example, even if hate crime laws exacerbate
negative identity politics, perhaps they should be retained if they deter perpetrators or
ameliorate the psychological effect on victims or the damage to their communities. For a
discussion of the latter two justifications for hate crime laws, see Lawrence, supra note 195,
at 342-43,347. The evidence on the deterrence effect of hate crime laws is slim. One study
appears to suggest a moderate decline in hate crimes in one city after hate crime legisla-
tion. 1992-1996 San Diego Hate Crimes Registry Executive Summaries, available at
http://www.adl.org/ (July 2000) (17 percent decline in such crimes in San Diego in
1996).
2/2 See supra Part 11.
213 See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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hate crime cases can only increase resentment and suspicion that the
laws cater to unfounded minority demands. Still, the requirement in
criminal law (and, for that matter, in other areas of the law) of deter-
mining a person's motive is more common and less onerous than crit-
ics like to admit. For example, juries in theft cases must determine
whether the defendant intended "to permanently deprive [the victim]
of the property" and in murder cases routinely determine (when
raised) whether a defendant's motive was self-defense. 214 Moreover,
the criminal justice system's approbation of judicial and prosecutorial
discretion demonstrates that the system "deliberately create[s] oppor-
tunities for the exercise of discretion in determining the appropriate
punishment for an offender based on offender motivation.""5 In fact,
there may be nothing new at all in hate crime laws' strategy of increas-
ing the punishment of perpetrators with 'bigoted' motives. "216 With-
out more, allegations that determining motive is too difficult and will
lead to incorrect results and resentment in the community, and that
the motive inquiry somehow sets hate crime laws apart from ordinary
criminal justice administration, should not compel repeal of hate
crime laws.
Other backfire claims seem even less compelling. The core of the
claim that hate crime laws are likely to increase bigotry is based on the
supposed lack of need for the laws in the first place. 217 According to
critics, instead of reacting to an epidemic of hate crimes, lawmakers
succumbed to interest group pressure and transient public opinion in
214 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 121 (3t1 ed. 2001) ("A defen-
dant's motive is often relevant in the criminal law."); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (applying tnixed-motive analysis in employtnent discrimination cases);
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485-87 (1993) (considering motive in sentencing);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cm. b (1979) (providing that consideration
requires a motive to extract something from one's exchange partner).
2'5 Carol S. Steiker, Book Review, Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Re-
vives Calls for Prohibition, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1869 (1999).
215
 Id. at 1868 ("Hp is and has always been commonplace ... to punish what we now
call `hate crimes' more than ordinary assaults or murder, even before a single hate crime
law was ever passed.").
217 "[Tlhere is no reliable evidence from which to conclude that the incidence of
[hate] crimes is greater now than previously, or that the incidence is increasing." jacoas &
POTTER, supra note 1, at 6.
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an environment in which lawmakers had little to lose in supporting
the laws.218
By supporting hate crime legislation, (politicians] could
please the advocacy groups without antagonizing any lobby-
ists on the other side (there were none) and without making
hard budgetary choices. The hate crime laws provided an
opportunity to denounce two evils—crime and bigotry—
without offending any constituencies or spending any
money. . . .
Hate crime legislation provides politicians the opportunity
to say to [the general voting population]: "we condemn
prejudice and bigotry in the strongest and most solemn way.
Moreover, in condemning prejudice, we affirm our own
prejudice-free character and assert a moral claim to your
support."219
Certainly, people generally impatient with legal regulation who
believe that hate clime laws are unnecessary are likely to resent the
laws and perhaps even to resent those whom the laws are designed to
protect. 220 Moreover, if there were little need for hate crime laws and
lawmakers precipitously adopted the laws simply to suit lobbyists or
fleeting public opinion, the likelihood that the end-product would be
unsatisfactory and therefore fail or even backfire would obviously in-
crease. In addition to supplying a rather bleak and one-sided picture
of the legislative process, however, the evidence supporting these alle-
gations is not convincing. Critics' principal support for the lack of an
epidemic of hate crimes is based not on empirical evidence but on a
historical review of the prevalence of intolerance in our society over
the long term. 221
 In short, there is no epidemic because intolerance
has always been a significant problem. If this assertion is correct, how-
218
 "Fundamentally, the hate crime laws are symbolic statements requested by advocacy
groups for material and symbolic reasons and provided by politicians for political reasons."
Id. at 65.
219 Id. at 67-68.
229 See id.
221 See id. at 59-63. Jacobs and Potter report on the hate crime statistics generated by
the FBI, but conclude that the "data are all but useless for discerning trends, because of
the variation in the number of states and police departments reporting." Id. at 59. But see
Christopher Chorba, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Ad, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 391 (2001)
(lilt is irresponsible to claim that hate crimes are on the rise, and a more accurate and
optimistic conclusion would be that hate crimes are on a steady decline.").
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ever, it only demonstrates that the time is long overdue to try some-
thing to deal with the problem. In fact, however, although far from
definitive, some evidence appears to show that intolerance has in-
creased,222 Such statistics tend to dispel the notion that lawmakers
chose a politically expedient route in creating hate crime laws instead
of responding to at least a perceived real problem. At any rate, critics
have failed to sustain the argument that hate crime laws will backfire
because there is no need for them.
Even assuming an increase in hate crimes, will hate crime laws
only contribute to greater intolerance because of resentment from
the very groups the laws seek to influence? Such animosity could
come in many forms. For example, jailed perpetrators might join
prison hate groups that reinforce each other's dismal perspectives. 223
Citizens with parochial viewpoints might wrongly believe hate crime
laws are unnecessary and resent them or even commit offenses to pro-
test the mainstream perspective. 224 Interest groups might resent their
exclusion from the protections of a hate crime law or decry the failure
of prosecutors to treat an incident as a hate crime. 225 But this is all
speculation, at best supported by a few lonely, albeit sensational, an-
ecdotes.226 In fact, it is just as likely that hate crime laws will benefit
222 See Lu-tN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW §§ 1:1, :2, :3 (Release #7 November 2000);
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND
CULTURE 277, 286 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995); Lawrence, supra note 195, at
342 n.85; Uhrich, supra note 195, at 1473. Jacobs and Potter, however, effectively debunk
some of the media's, politicians', and scholars' proof of. a hate crime epidemic. See JAcoss
& PorrER, supra note 1, at 45-64.
Allegations of racial harassment have burgeoned in the past ten years. Fred Tasker,
Nooses as Racial Threats Still a Disturbing Reality: Bigotry, 1991 Law Prompt a Rapid Rise In Law-
suits, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2001, at IA. The newspaper reports an increase from 9,757 to
47,175 allegations from the 1980s to the 1990s and concludes that "IA he explosion of
lawsuits seems to contradict the belief among many sociologists that race relations in
America are slowly getting better." Id. at 1A.
223 Uhrich, supra note 195, at 1493-94. "A hate criminal with the textbook psychologi-
cal profile of extreme prejudice is likely to increase his or her violent activity upon release
from prison." Id. at 1494; see alsojAcons & POTTER, supra note 1, at 68.
224 JACOBS & POTTER, supra note I, at 68.
7" See supra notes 222-224 and accompanying text.
226 Granted, some of the anecdotes are headline worthy and emotional. But that is part
of the problem, especially when an incident actually has little to do with hate crime laws.
For example, Jacobs and Potter devote two pages to the racial disharmony caused by the
attack on a white, female jogger in Central Park by several young blacks and Hispanics.
Jacous & POTTER, supra note I, at 140-142. The hysteria, however was not caused by hate
crime laws. Jacobs and Potter only insinuate that a hate crime prosecution would have
"exacerbated tensions." See id. at 142.
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society, if in no other way than by demonstrating symbolically that
hate crimes are a particular anathema, which society will no longer
tolerate. 227 In addition, it is just as plausible that supporters of hate
crime laws, including such diverse groups as "African Americans, Jews,
Asians, Christians, Muslims, victims, immigrants, gays, educators, and
the police,"228
 will find greater common ground by pursuing their
mutual concern. 229 Without some persuasive evidence of a backfire,
then, hate crime laws should not be repealed simply because critics
raise the specter of a legal backfire. Lawmakers should turn their at-
tention to other vexing issues presented by hate crimes legislation,
such as their definition, justification, constitutionality, and deterrence
value.
CONCLUSION
Although this Article focuses on legal backfire claims, it touches
upon a much more basic problem: The challenges to effective law-
making and the limitations of techniques to evaluate the effects of law
make an accurate assessment of law problematic. Among the many
questions raised by this observation, this Article has dealt with the is-
sue of how lawmakers should react to legal backfire claims. Because
critics of laws almost invariably author legal backfire claims, because
the claims are rhetorically charged, and because the claims are rather
extraordinary—a law has produced a result directly contrary to that in-
tended—lawmakers should proceed with caution.
227
 See id. at 91, 130; Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERD1SC. U. 389, 413 (1993) ("The 'transformative function' of a legal
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